State of Utah v. Edward Walter Barela : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
State of Utah v. Edward Walter Barela : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Attorney Generals Office; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Bryan P. Galloway; Attorney for Defendant/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Barela, No. 20070506 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/326
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
EDWARD WALTER BARELA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Appellate Case No. 20070506 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
THIS APPEAL IS FROM CONVICTION AND SUBSEQUENT 
SENTENCING TO POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE (WITH PRIORS), A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, AND WAS 
SENTENCED TO AN INDETERMINATE TERM OF NOT LESS THAN 
ZERO AND WHICH MAY BE FOR FIVE YEARS AT THE UTAH STATE 
PRISON IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE GORDON 
LOW PRESIDING. 
DEFENDANT IS CURRENTLY INCARCERATED IN THE UTAH STATE 
PRISON. 
Attorney Generals Office 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140814 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814 
Telephone: (801)366-0100 
BRYAN P. GALLOWAY 
76 W. 100 North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435)752-3596 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
FSLEC 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
DEC 102007 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
EDWARD WALTER BARELA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
He 
Appellate Case No. 20070506 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
THIS APPEAL IS FROM CONVICTION AND SUBSEQUENT 
SENTENCING TO POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE (WITH PRIORS), A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, AND WAS 
SENTENCED TO AN INDETERMINATE TERM OF NOT LESS THAN 
ZERO AND WHICH MAY BE FOR FIVE YEARS AT THE UTAH STATE 
PRISON IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE GORDON 
LOW PRESIDING. 
DEFENDANT IS CURRENTLY INCARCERATED IN THE UTAH STATE 
PRISON. 
Attorney Generals Office BRYAN P. GALLOWAY 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 76 W. 100 North 
P.O. Box 140814 Logan, Utah 84321 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814 
Telephone: (801)366-0100 Telephone: (435)752-3596 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 7 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 7 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 9 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT TO PRISON 9 
CONCLUSION 13 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 13 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
UTAH STATE CASES 
State v. Chapoose, 985 P.2d 915 (Utah 1999) 9 
State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 30 (Utah 1998) 9,10, 11, 12 
State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 9,10 
State v Nuttall, 861 P.2d454, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 2 
State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) 9 
STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 1 
78-2a-3(2)(e)(2003) 1 
58-37-8 2 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
EDWARD WALTER BARELA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a plea and subsequent sentencing to Possession of a 
Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of U.C.A 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i). On June 12, 2007 the Honorable Gordon Low signed an Entry of 
Judgement, Sentence and Commitment sentencing the Defendant to serve a term of zero 
to five years at the Utah State Prison. On June 22, 2007 the Defendant filed a Notice of 
Appeal. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(2003). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT TO PRISON? 
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Standard of Review: The Court must determine whether the trial court abused its 
discretion when it sentenced the Defendant to Prison even though the Defendant was 
doing very well on Private Probation at the time of sentencing, it would be an excessive 
hardship on the Defendant and his dependants including his seven month old child, and 
the Defendant had been involved in full-time employment and counseling. "A sentence 
will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused its discretion, failed to 
consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally 
prescribed limits." State v Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.C.A. 58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or 
arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in a conduct which results in any 
violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37,37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; 
and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 
58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in 
concert with five or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position 
or organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, or 
gamma hydroxybulyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony 
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
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(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third 
degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of second degree 
felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified is Schedule V is guilty of a class A Misdemeanor and 
upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or 
(iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment an indeterminate term as provided by law, but 
if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined is Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or 
possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during the commission in 
furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for 
a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may 
additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first 
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than 
seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not 
be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid 
prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, 
tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit 
them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled 
substances in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged 
prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree 
felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more 
than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of 
a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any 
part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty 
of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a second or subsequent conviction or possession of any controlled 
substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this Subsection(2). 
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(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than 
one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction 
the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction 
the person is guilty or a third degree felony. 
(e) Any person convicted or violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the 
exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in 
Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a 
penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is 
with respect to controlled substances as listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as provided by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year 
to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the 
person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (4)(c) who, in an offense 
not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in his body 
any measurable amount of controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, 
causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death or another. 
(3) Prohibited acts C - Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance 
a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, 
for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent 
himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, 
or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the 
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person 
known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the 
administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person 
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to disclose his receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, 
deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription written order for a controlled 
substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled 
substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or 
written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing 
designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying 
mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug 
or container or labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D - Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under 
this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, 
Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation 
Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications 
under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds or any 
of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary institution or on the 
grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds 
which are, at the time of the act, being used for any activity sponsored by or through a 
school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, 
playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in Subsections 
(4)(a)(i) through (viii); 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless 
of where the act occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, 
or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds 
of any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony 
and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would 
otherwise have been established but for this subsection would have been a first degree 
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felony. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person 
is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have 
been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under 
Subsection (2)(g) or this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum 
penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) (i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term 
of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate 
term not exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting 
with the mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly 
solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person 
to commit a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor 
mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the 
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly 
believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection 
(4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act occurred was as described in 
Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in 
lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violated a federal law or the law of another 
state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same 
act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows 
a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a 
controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did 
so with knowledge of the character of the substance or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian , in good faith and in the course of his 
professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or 
administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered 
by an assistant or orderly under his direction and supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manufactures, 
distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or 
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investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of a 
professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his 
employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person 
or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect 
without the invalid provision or application. 
U.C.A. 78-2a-3(2)(e)(2003)- Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by information with Possession of a Controlled 
Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a third degree felony; Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, 
a class A misdemeanor; and Clandestine Laboratory Endangerment of Child or Elder, 
a third degree felony. On April 25,2007 the Defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge 
of Possession of a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a third degree felony. The 
Defendant was sentenced on June 12, 2007 to a term of zero to five years at the Utah 
State Prison. The sentence, judgment and commitment was signed on June 12,2007. A 
notice of appeal was filed on June 22, 2007. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant was charged by information with Possession of a Controlled 
Substance in a Drug Free Zone a third degree felony amongst other charges. On April 
25, 2007 the Defendant plead guilty to the third degree felony Drug Possession charge 
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with the remaining charges being dismissed. Following the Defendant's plea of guilty 
a pre-sentence investigative report was prepared by Adult Probation and Parole, page 2 
in the Factual Summary of the Offense in such report states: 
On or around November 21,2006 deputies served a search warrant on the 
residence. They found Mr. Barela and his "stepson" Kenneth Lee Vasquez. 
Mr. Vasquez claimed ownership of the meth pipe found in the living room 
area. Mr. Barela admitted he had used the three soda cans found in the 
kitchen with suspected marijuana for smoking marijuana. He admitted 
holding marijuana for friend and that he had taken some of the marijuana 
and put it into a pill bottle. Deputies found a baggie of purported 
marijuana in Mr. Barela's bedroom and a pill bottle of purported 
marijuana in one of Mr. Barela's sweaters 
The Defendant was sentenced on June 12, 2007. Defense counsel correctly 
informed the court that the Defendant, admittedly having a lengthy criminal record, is 
currently doing very well on probation, on probation with Private Probation Services 
under the director of probation officer "Mike". Mike indicated in the pre-sentence report 
prepared by Adult Probation and Parole that the Defendant "is doing very good except 
for the new charges." The Defendant was also very active in counseling and involving 
himself in the life of his seven month old child. Adult Probation and Parole recommended 
a prison sentence in the pre-sentence report, the criminal history matrix showed the 
Defendant fell in the category of intermediate sanctions, 18 months. 
The trial judge responded to the Defendant's request for a sentence of probation 
by saying: 
Mr. Barela, by my count, in the last 30 years you have ten plus assault 
charges. You have several violation of protective orders. Child neglect 
cases, four failures to appear, half a dozen drug charges at least. Theft, at 
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least hal f a do/en. There's nothing in your record which would indicate' 
you would be compliant now with probation. 
Tin1 I Ytnil llinn srnlciuvd llir DcitMidanl In pus »n despite I he lac! he had been 
compliant on probation and in light of the fact the ci iminal histoi > matrix in :l icated an 
intermediate sanction sentence, which calls for either probation or prison. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Court should have considered the four mitigating factors outlined in State \ ' Galli, 967 
P.2d 30 (Utah 1998). Three of these four factors work in the Defendant's favor. (1) Ihere 
was no
 v iK ^ . u iiu suffered an injury, (2) the Defendant expressed to the trial court his 
c - ) the coi ii t didn' t consider his rehabilitative 
needs. Admittedly, the fourth factor that this was not the Defendant's first felony as an 
adult or juvenile would work against the Defendant in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL i O . - K T ABUSED 11 'S DISCR E 1 101 J W I IET i II 'SEN I EN C ED 
THE DEFFVDA VT TO PRISON. 
The sentencing decision of a trial court is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Houk. 006 P ?"\ Wn ooo (Utah Ct. App. 1999)(per curium). This includes the 
decisic *• i, . • ., .. -. .\-..:, • i napoose,'AY"* I'.JM ()l >( I Kali lK)W). 
An abuse of discretion occi irs when "the ji idge fails t :) sonside r all legally rele^ > ant 
factors or if the sentence imposed is clearly excessive." State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 
1234, 1235 (Vtah 1990)(citations and quotations omitted.) Furthermore, an appellate 
9 
court can only find an abuse of discretion "if it can be said that no reasonable [person] 
would take the view adopted by the trial court." State v. Houk, 906 P.2d at 909 
(alteration in original)(quotations omitted). 
The trial court abused its discretion in this case because it failed to consider all the 
legally relevant factors and it imposed an excessive sentence. Specifically, the trial court 
failed to consider the Defendant's rehabilitative needs, there was no victim, and the 
Defendant expressed desire to comply and change. 
The Defendant plead guilty to Possession of a Controlled Substance in a Drug 
Free Zone, a third degree felony. The pre-sentence report from Adult Probation and 
Parole was included with an official record and it is undisputed that the criminal history 
matrix put the Defendant into a category that would result in a sentence of intermediate 
sanctions. The Defendant's attorney asked the court to sentence the Defendant to a term 
that included probation together with a program to address his substance abuse problems. 
In State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 30 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court outlined four 
mitigating factors that the trial court failed to consider. The Court reversed the trial 
courts' decisions to impose consecutive sentences. Although the Defendant in the case 
at bar was sentenced on just one charge, the Supreme Court's reasoning was sound and 
should be applied in this case to determine if there was an abuse of discretion. In Galli, 
the Supreme Court found that the trial courts abused their discretion. "The record shows 
that Judges Iwasaki and Rigtrup may not have given adequate weight to certain 
mitigating circumstances." Id. at 938. 
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In i.,.*,.? ihj io v.c*v h ^ r uii/tv;i..;..*;, ,.;c [;.-! ...mi is i ailed u. ^>n.v.dei that caused 
t h e m to abi lse their discretion I 'hre e of the foi n factors can be applied fa\ oral)!;; t D the 
Defendan t ' s si tuation. The first factor was that Ualii hud not inflicted physical injuries 
on his vict ims. Id. Galli had used a gun, bu t it was a pel le t gun that was incapable of 
inflicting a set ioiis injui y I \ i In the case at • \*: .;«c .;. i,-.. w..; K p I cd guilty to possession 
of marijuana in a di i lg fi ee zone ' rhei e was no \ ictii n <» > he • he had inflicted inji n y :)i:i 
• T h e second factor in Galli w as 'that his criminal history did not support the 
imposition of consecutive sentences. Id. In the case at bar, the Defendant admittedly has 
a lengtiu , ..1111;. i •.. •. . A* record was referred to many times in the sentencing 
heanni: • * • . . - . • ' * 
The third factor was that _jlli had voluntarily confessed and admitted 
responsibilities for his crimes. "The record suggests that he has expressed a commitment 
a -.j . . . . . u s ; the case at bai , the Defendant stated in the 
sentencing hearing: 
I apologize to the state for my stupidin 1 11 do w hat i got u -• ,;, • u make it 
right. If it's fines, if it's counseling, 1 M d-.» weekly UA's. Whatever it takes 
to make things right I will do, I'm sincere when I say anybody comes to 
my house and wants to drink or smoke, I tell them to walk out the door and 
I mean that. One of the hardest things for me was when my baby's mom 
didn't want to stop drinking and having friends over, I had to get a 
restraining order on that. I meant what I said, I don't want my daughter 
around that. 
The Court was also informed that the Defendant has a substance abuse problem and 
wants help in trying to p :. -..•;. e r-a^ Mgether. 
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The fourth and final Galli factor was that consecutive sentences were not in 
accord with Galli's rehabilitative needs. The Supreme Court believed that Galli's 
conduct in Minnesota showed that he had the ability to improve himself and be a 
productive law abiding citizen. Id. 
The trial court did not consider the Defendant's rehabilitative needs. All parties 
informed the court that the pre-sentence report indicated the Defendant had a fairly 
lengthy criminal history, including controlled substance abuse. Such intermediate 
sanction recommendation and the Defendant5 s willingness to address his substance abuse 
problem should guide the court to a sentence of probation. 
However, the court did not acknowledge or address the Defendant's rehabilitative 
needs. It focused on the fact that the Defendant has a long criminal record. There was 
never any acknowledgment by the sentencing court that the Defendant had a substance 
abuse problem, nor was there any exploration into the possibility that his long criminal 
history was due to his prolonged substance abuse problems. 
These were all reasons why the Defendant should have been placed on probation 
and given a chance at rehabilitation. 
The trial court should have considered all of the factors outlined by the Supreme 
Court in Galli. The trial court failed to consider these factors, and therefore abused its 
discretion when it sentenced the Defendant to the Utah State Prison. For these reasons, 
the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to remand this case back to the trial court 
so he can be re-sentenced. 
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( i 
1 . ., • - ^ \i • • :i! i , onsider the Defendant's 
rehabilitative needs. For these reasons the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to 
remand his case V-vk to t1— vi.-.i ;-•—,:-*• v be re-sentenced. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appeihrt 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy ^1 uic ui;i>\ c .U.J i. iregoing 
BRIEF OF APPELL ANT posl.i. - ,-^ >•''• •••• « nC. .i . « ;-.. - H ^ W O 
South, 5th Floor, P.O. Box 140814, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814 
On this ~V~^ day of December, 2007. 
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FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
DEC t 0 2007 
There is no addendum needed in the case of State v. Barela, Appellate C 
No. 20070506. 
ase 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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